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THE LAST ESTOP: WHY JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE
A COURT’S LAST RESORT FOR UNDISCLOSED LAWSUITS
FROM BANKRUPTCY†
ABSTRACT
This Comment analyzes federal and state courts’ application of judicial
estoppel to a lawsuit that a consumer debtor failed to disclose in a prior
bankruptcy case. Federal courts are split on most aspects of the judicial estoppel
doctrine when applied to an undisclosed lawsuit from bankruptcy. Not all state
courts recognize the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and those that do recognize it
may apply the federal judicial estoppel doctrine or their own doctrine.
Confusion throughout the federal circuits and state courts regarding judicial
estoppel has harmed debtors, creditors, and the federal bankruptcy court
system.
This Comment argues that non-bankruptcy courts should not apply the
judicial estoppel doctrine to undisclosed lawsuits from bankruptcy. Application
of judicial estoppel in this context is both inequitable and contrary to provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. The continued effect of the automatic stay on property
of the bankruptcy estate makes all non-bankruptcy court judgments dismissing
undisclosed lawsuits void. Defendants who seek to assert judicial estoppel
against an undisclosed lawsuit must first petition the bankruptcy court to reopen
the debtor’s bankruptcy case to request relief from the automatic stay. The
bankruptcy court may then appoint a trustee who can either abandon the claim
or pursue the claim for the benefit of the creditors. This approach is both
equitable and conforms to the Bankruptcy Code. This Comment concludes that
judicial estoppel should not and may not be applied to undisclosed lawsuits from
bankruptcy until the bankruptcy court grants relief from the automatic stay.

†

This comment received the 2016 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.
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INTRODUCTION
The notion that plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court is a fundamental
characteristic of the United States judicial system.1 However, plaintiffs are
routinely denied their day in court when they have previously filed for
bankruptcy but failed to disclose a potential lawsuit.2 In bankruptcy, a potential
lawsuit is an asset that the debtor must disclose to the bankruptcy court.3 When
a debtor fails to disclose a potential lawsuit on her bankruptcy schedules and
later pursues that lawsuit in a non-bankruptcy court, the non-bankruptcy court
may determine that the debtor has taken inconsistent positions in an attempt to
manipulate the judicial system.4 Courts approach this issue in different ways,
but the majority of courts apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel.5
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that is meant to protect the integrity
of the court system.6 Judicial estoppel allows a court to dismiss7 a plaintiff’s
claim if the plaintiff has taken inconsistent positions in different court
proceedings to manipulate the judicial system and gain an advantage.8 Federal
courts and many state courts have applied judicial estoppel when a debtorturned-plaintiff fails to disclose a lawsuit in bankruptcy.9
The following examples will better illustrate the role of judicial estoppel in
the undisclosed lawsuit context. Consider the stories of Jane and John. Jane’s
situation represents the case of the debtor who is unaware of her claim and whose
nondisclosure was due to an innocent mistake. John’s situation represents the

1 Terrell v. Allison, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 289, 292 (1874) (“It is a rule old as the law that no man shall be
condemned in his rights of property, as well as in his rights of person, without his day in court; that is, without
being duly cited to answer respecting them, and being heard or having opportunity of being heard thereon.”).
2 See Ibok v. SIAC-Sector Inc., 470 F. App’x 27, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that judicial estoppel “is
commonly applied in order ‘to prevent a party who failed to disclose a claim in bankruptcy proceedings from
asserting that claim after emerging from bankruptcy’” (quoting Coffaro v. Crespo, 721 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148
(E.D.N.Y. 2010)).
3 See infra Part I.A.
4 See infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
5 See infra Parts II.B–C.
6 Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982).
7 Defendants typically move for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel in this context. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Lewis Cass Intermediate Sch. Dist. (In re Johnson), 345 B.R. 816, 818 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2006) (moving for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel). The effect of granting a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on this issue is ultimately a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. See Barger v. City
of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he District court dismissed Barger’s discrimination
case by entering summary judgment against her.”).
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 See infra Part II.B–C.
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case of the debtor attempting to take advantage of the courts and get an unfair
benefit from the judicial process.
Jane is a single mother who works at a restaurant in California. For years,
Jane has always felt uncomfortable with the way her manager interacts with her,
but she continues to work there because the job pays well. Unfortunately, Jane’s
manager fires her because she constantly refuses his romantic advances. Jane is
unable to find comparable work and has to settle for a job that pays much less.
After a few months of struggling to pay her bills, Jane decides to file a petition
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. She files without an attorney,
receives a discharge, and comes out of bankruptcy with a fresh start. Six months
after receiving her discharge, Jane realizes that she may have a wrongful
termination claim against the restaurant that fired her. Jane hires a lawyer and
files a complaint against the restaurant in federal court.
John runs a successful business in Vermont. Despite his success, John lives
such a lavish lifestyle that he is unable to pay all of his debts. John decides to
file a petition for relief under Chapter 7 and hires an attorney. John’s attorney
asks him if he has any potential or pending lawsuits. John knows he has a claim
against a business associate, but decides not to tell his attorney. John is granted
a discharge in his bankruptcy case. Six months later, John files a lawsuit against
his business associate in Vermont state court.
In an ideal system, judicial estoppel would prevent debtors like John from
taking advantage of the judicial system and would forgive Jane for her innocent
mistake. However, the development of judicial estoppel has been far from ideal.
Debtors similar to Jane are estopped in some jurisdictions,10 and debtors like
John may bring their claims without fear of being estopped in other
jurisdictions.11
The stories of Jane and John represent two possible outcomes when a debtor
fails to disclose a lawsuit in bankruptcy. Despite the varying circumstances
underlying Jane’s and John’s stories, the same basic elements are present:
something bad happened, resulting in their potentially bringing a lawsuit; they
10 See Granados v. Supervalu, Inc., No. LA CV11-10175 JAK (MANx), 2012 WL 3562521, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2012) (“The issue . . . with respect to estoppel is not whether Plaintiff acted in good faith[,] . . .
[but] is instead whether Plaintiff had sufficient factual knowledge about the conditions of his employment to
know that a potential cause of action existed during the pendency of his bankruptcy.” (emphasis omitted)).
11 The Supreme Court of Vermont has not adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel. In re Chittenden Solid
Waste Dist., 928 A.2d 1183, 1192 (Vt. 2007) (noting that the Supreme Court has “not affirmatively adopted
judicial estoppel”).
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later ended up in financial distress and sought relief from the bankruptcy court;
they received relief from the bankruptcy court; they pursued the lawsuit; and
then the defendant raised the affirmative defense of judicial estoppel. Jane and
John’s stories diverge on one important issue: forum choice. Jane had a federal
claim that she brought in federal court. John had a state law claim that he brought
in state court. There are other forum possibilities that may arise in this context.
The undisclosed lawsuit journey always begins in a bankruptcy court, but
may end up in state or federal court under state or federal law. A plaintiff may
file a federal claim in state court12 or federal court.13 If the plaintiff chooses to
file in state court, the defendant may remove the lawsuit to federal court.14 A
plaintiff may file a state law claim in state court or in federal court if she can
meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.15 If the plaintiff’s claim meets
the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, and the plaintiff files in state court,
the defendant may still remove the case to federal court.16
In the undisclosed lawsuit context, forum choice has become a deciding
factor when judicial estoppel arises because federal and state courts do not apply
judicial estoppel uniformly.17 Federal circuits are also split on choice of law
issues for judicial estoppel when sitting in diversity jurisdiction.18 Moreover,
undisclosed lawsuits from bankruptcy create jurisdictional issues that are
different for state courts and non-bankruptcy federal courts.19 The inherent
variability of judicial estoppel as a discretionary, common-law doctrine,
combined with the various forum and choice of law possibilities, has created
extreme confusion and inconsistency throughout the court systems.20 This
inconsistency has led to inequitable results from the perspective of debtors,
creditors, and the bankruptcy court system—resulting in a need for a more

12 See Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Affordable Health Care Sols., Inc., 121 P.3d 350, 353 (Colo. App. 2005)
(“[S]tate courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have jurisdiction over federal claims. This presumption
can only be rebutted ‘by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or
by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.’” (citations omitted)).
13 See Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002) (“In this case, judicial
estoppel is raised in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding and a federal employment discrimination
case . . . .”).
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (“A civil action
filed in a state court may be removed to federal court if the claim is one ‘arising under’ federal law.”).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (providing the requirements for diversity jurisdiction).
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (providing the requirements for removal based on diversity of citizenship).
17 See infra Part II.B–C.
18 See infra notes 155–67 and accompanying text.
19 See infra Part IV.B.
20 See infra Part II.B–C.
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uniform and equitable approach that judicial estoppel is not equipped to solve
on its own.21
Judicial estoppel’s inequitable results in this context have led the Eleventh
Circuit to reconsider its judicial estoppel doctrine en banc.22 In Slater v. U.S.
Steel Corp., the Eleventh Circuit judicially estopped debtor-plaintiff Sandra
Slater’s employment discrimination lawsuit for failing to disclose the lawsuit on
her bankruptcy schedules.23 Judge Tjoflat concurred in the judgment but wrote
specially to identify the equitable issues that judicial estoppel creates in the
undisclosed lawsuit context.24 Other federal and state courts may soon question
judicial estoppel’s inequitable effects in this context as well, and those courts
should consider the goals of the bankruptcy system and all applicable provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts should use judicial estoppel as a last resort when a debtor fails to
disclose a lawsuit in her bankruptcy case and later brings that lawsuit in a nonbankruptcy court. In this context, judicial estoppel has failed to achieve its main
goal of protecting the integrity of the court system.25 Even in an ideal system—
where judicial estoppel is applied uniformly to prevent debtor-plaintiffs like
John from misleading the courts—creditors are harmed.26 As a stand-alone
doctrine, judicial estoppel is inadequate to protect creditors, the bankruptcy
court, and the goals of the federal bankruptcy system.27 In addition, nonbankruptcy courts have failed to properly apply the Bankruptcy Code in this
context, affecting bankruptcy courts’ ability to adequately administer property
of bankruptcy estates.28
This Comment proposes that non-bankruptcy courts should require the
parties involved in an undisclosed lawsuit to return to the bankruptcy court.
Returning to the bankruptcy court is required due to the continued effect of the
automatic stay.29 The bankruptcy court is the only court that may grant relief
21

See infra Part IV.A.
Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 820 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Aug.
30, 2016).
23 Id. at 1199.
24 Id. at 1210 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (arguing that, as a result of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision,
“U.S. Steel is granted a windfall, Slater’s creditors are deprived of an asset, and the Bankruptcy Court is stripped
of its discretion”).
25 See infra Part IV.A.
26 See infra Part IV.A.
27 See infra Part IV.A.
28 See infra Part IV.B.
29 See infra Part IV.B.
22
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from the automatic stay.30 When the bankruptcy case is reopened, the
bankruptcy court may provide a more equitable solution from the perspective of
the courts as well as the debtor and creditors. Both courts will also be
substantially protected from manipulation if the bankruptcy court is allowed the
opportunity to rule on the judicial estoppel issue when necessary.31
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background on the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional
grant as they relate to judicial estoppel in the undisclosed lawsuit context. Part II
discusses state and federal courts’ inequitable use of judicial estoppel in this
context. Part III analyzes two alternatives to judicial estoppel that some courts
have employed to avoid inequitable results. Part III also discusses how those
alternatives create the same inequitable results as judicial estoppel in the
undisclosed lawsuit context. Part IV analyzes the equitable and statutory
concerns created by judicial estoppel in the undisclosed lawsuit context and
provides an equitable framework for undisclosed lawsuits that incorporates
necessary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
I. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY PROVISIONS
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that reflects the principle that a
litigant should not be allowed to benefit by taking inconsistent positions in
different legal proceedings when attempting to mislead the courts.32 Courts that
have applied judicial estoppel to undisclosed lawsuits from bankruptcy have
incorporated provisions of the Bankruptcy Code into the judicial estoppel
analysis.33 This Part discusses relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdictional grant, and how those provisions relate to
judicial estoppel in the undisclosed lawsuit context. This Part first analyzes the
30

See In re Dominguez, 312 B.R. 499, 505 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Congress has declared that actions
to ‘terminate, annul, or modify’ the automatic stay are core bankruptcy proceedings. . . . Consequently, it is
undisputed that only a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay.”
(citation omitted)).
31 See infra Part II.A.
32 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001); William Houston Brown, Lundy Carpenter &
Donna T. Snow, Debtors’ Counsel Beware: Use of the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel in Nonbankruptcy Forums,
75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 200 (2001) [hereinafter Debtors’ Counsel Beware] (“The doctrine’s underlying theory
is that a party should not be permitted to take one position under oath, which was in some manner accepted by
one court, and to then alter that position in a subsequent judicial proceeding, resulting in a second court being
misled in some manner . . . .”).
33 See, e.g., Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying judicial estoppel to an undisclosed
lawsuit from bankruptcy and discussing property of the estate, § 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the
debtor’s duty to disclose, § 521(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code).
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broad definition of property of the bankruptcy estate, which encompasses
undisclosed lawsuits, and the debtor’s duty to disclose undisclosed lawsuits. It
then discusses the automatic stay, which has largely been ignored by nonbankruptcy courts in this context. This Part ends by discussing the bankruptcy
court’s exclusive jurisdiction over property of the estate.
A. Property of the Estate and the Debtor’s Duty to Disclose
When a debtor files a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, the filing
of the petition creates the bankruptcy estate, which consists of “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.”34 Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the bankruptcy estate for
all bankruptcy cases.35 Congress intended for the scope of § 541 to be broad.36
This broad definition of the bankruptcy estate encompasses nearly all of a
debtor’s prepetition assets (assets that exist before the debtor files for
bankruptcy),37 including potential lawsuits belonging to the debtor.38
The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors different options for dealing with
their indebtedness.39 This Comment focuses on individuals filing petitions for
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.40 Filing a petition for relief under
Chapter 7 “authorizes a discharge of prepetition debts following the liquidation
of the debtor’s assets by a bankruptcy trustee, who then distributes the proceeds
34

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
See 11. U.S.C. § 541(a) (“The commencement of a case under . . . this title creates an estate.”).
36 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978) (“The scope of [§ 541(a)(1)] is broad. It includes all kinds of property,
including tangible or intangible property, [and] causes of action . . . .”), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5868.
37 See Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015) (“[W]hile a Chapter 7 debtor must forfeit virtually
all his prepetition property, he is able to make a ‘fresh start’ by shielding from creditors his postpetition earnings
and acquisitions.”); Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing property of
the estate and noting that “[s]uch property includes causes of action belonging to the debtor at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case”).
38 See Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 (describing that the bankruptcy estate “includes causes of action belonging
to the debtor at the commencement of the bankruptcy case”); supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (discussing the differences between
filing under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code).
40 For the purposes of judicial estoppel, the main difference between Chapter 7 cases and Chapter 13 cases
concerns the scope of property of the estate. When an individual debtor files a petition for relief under Chapter
13, the bankruptcy estate includes the debtor’s prepetition assets as well as all property acquired after the debtor
files for bankruptcy and before the bankruptcy case closes. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (2012); Harris, 135 S. Ct. at
1835 (“[T]he Chapter 13 estate from which creditors may be paid includes both the debtor’s property at the time
of his bankruptcy petition, and any wages and property acquired after filing.”). Because this Comment focuses
on judicial estoppel’s application to prepetition assets, discussing differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
cases is beyond the scope of this Comment.
35
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to creditors.”41 In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the trustee controls the
bankruptcy estate.42 A Chapter 7 debtor no longer has any property rights in
assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate as long as the asset remains part of the
bankruptcy estate.43 An asset only returns to the debtor in the event such asset is
abandoned pursuant to § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code44 or the bankruptcy court
dismisses the debtor’s bankruptcy case.45 If the debtor’s bankruptcy case is not
dismissed and the asset is not abandoned or administered in the bankruptcy case,
the asset remains a part of the bankruptcy estate indefinitely.46 Thus, when a
debtor fails to disclose a lawsuit in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case that is not
dismissed, the undisclosed lawsuit remains part of the bankruptcy estate
indefinitely because the Chapter 7 trustee neither administered nor abandoned
the lawsuit.47
Debtors have a duty to disclose all of their assets and liabilities.48 The
debtor’s assets include all “[c]laims against third parties whether or not [the
debtor] has filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment.”49 The debtor must
disclose all assets so that they are available for distribution to creditors.50 When
a debtor fails to disclose a potential lawsuit on her schedule of assets, the debtor
violates her statutory duties.51 The debtor’s failure to disclose an asset decreases
41

Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367.
See Harris, 135 S. Ct. at 1835 (“A Chapter 7 trustee is then charged with selling the property in the
estate and distributing the proceeds to the debtor’s creditors.” (citations omitted)).
43 See Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 795 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The commencement of Chapter
7 bankruptcy extinguishes a debtor’s legal rights and interests in any pending litigation, and transfers those rights
to the trustee, acting on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.”); Jay L. Gottlieb & Brian E. Greer, The Doctrines of
Standing and Judicial Estoppel: How Actions or Omissions in Bankruptcy Proceedings May Preclude the
Assertion of Claims by a Debtor in a Subsequent Action, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 487, 488 (2000) (“[O]nce an
asset becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, all rights held by the debtor in the asset are extinguished . . . .”)
44 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2012).
45 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3) (2012) (providing that dismissal of a bankruptcy case “revests the property of the
estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case under
this title”).
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (“Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned
under this section and that is not administered in the case remains property of the estate.”); Parker v. Wendy’s
Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Failure to list an interest on a bankruptcy schedule leaves that
interest in the bankruptcy estate.”).
47 See sources cited supra note 46.
48 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“The debtor shall . . . file . . . a schedule of assets and
liabilities . . . .”); Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The
Code imposes on debtors an affirmative duty of full disclosure.”).
49 OFFICIAL BANKR. FORMS, FORM B 106A/B, ¶ 33.
50 Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A long-standing
tenet of bankruptcy law requires one seeking benefits under its terms to satisfy a companion duty to schedule,
for the benefit of creditors, all his interests and property rights.”).
51 Ryan Operations G.P., 81 F.3d at 362.
42
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the amount available for distribution to creditors and ultimately harms
creditors.52 The debtor’s disclosure requirements are an essential element of the
bankruptcy system.53 The bankruptcy court relies on these disclosures and “the
importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be overstated.”54 If a debtor later
pursues an undisclosed lawsuit in a post-bankruptcy proceeding, the nonbankruptcy court could interpret the debtor-plaintiff’s actions as being
inconsistent—giving rise to judicial estoppel as a potential defense.55 When
judicial estoppel arises in this context, the non-bankruptcy court must determine
whether the lawsuit is property of the bankruptcy estate under state law and the
Bankruptcy Code.
As in many other areas of law, timing in bankruptcy is everything. The
bankruptcy estate is created the moment the debtor files a bankruptcy petition.56
When a debtor files a petition for relief under Chapter 7, the distinction between
prepetition property and postpetition property is essential to determining what
property becomes property of the estate.57 This distinction also becomes
essential for a judicial estoppel analysis because the application of judicial
estoppel is predicated on the fact that the undisclosed lawsuit should have been
disclosed and is part of the bankruptcy estate.58 Only lawsuits that accrue
prepetition become property of the estate.59 Although state law is important in
determining the accrual date of a lawsuit, the Bankruptcy Code “is not restricted
by state law concepts such as when a cause of action ripens or a statute of
limitations begins to run, and ‘property of the estate’ may include claims that
were inchoate on the petition date.”60 To determine if a lawsuit is part of the
bankruptcy estate, a court must find that the lawsuit has “sufficient roots in the

52 See Williams v. Hainje, 375 F. App’x 625, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting “the bankruptcy law’s goal of
unearthing all assets for the benefit of creditors”).
53 Ryan Operations G.P., 81 F.3d at 362.
54 Id.
55 Debtors’ Counsel Beware, supra note 32, at 204.
56 See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Winick & Reich, P.C. v. Strada Design Assocs. (In
re Strada Design Assocs.), 326 B.R. 229, 235 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he filing of a bankruptcy petition
creates an estate . . . .”).
57 See Ceja-Corona v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01703-AWI-SAB, 2014 WL 1679410, at *10
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014) (“[I]n Chapter 7 actions, the bankruptcy estate only includes causes of action which
existed as of the date the petition was filed—causes of action which accrued post-petition are not part of a
Chapter 7 estate.”).
58 See id. at *11 (finding that some of the plaintiff’s claims accrued prepetition and others accrued postpetition and only applying judicial estoppel to the plaintiff’s prepetition claims).
59 See In re Strada Design Assocs., 326 B.R. at 235 (“Without doubt, causes of action that accrue under
state law prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition become ‘property of the estate.’”).
60 Id. at 236.
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debtor’s pre-bankruptcy activities and is not entangled with the debtor’s ‘fresh
start,’ regardless of when the claim accrues under state law or the statute of
limitations begins to run.”61
When a Chapter 7 debtor fails to disclose a post-petition lawsuit, the lawsuit
is not property of the bankruptcy estate, and judicial estoppel is not an applicable
ground for dismissal.62 However, when a Chapter 7 debtor fails to disclose a
prepetition lawsuit, the lawsuit is property of the estate and remains part of the
estate indefinitely. Therefore, if a debtor then pursues an undisclosed lawsuit in
a post-bankruptcy proceeding, the lawsuit may be subject to dismissal under a
judicial estoppel analysis.63
B. The Automatic Stay
The automatic stay has a broad scope and “plays a vital and fundamental role
in bankruptcy.”64 When a debtor files a petition for relief, the act of filing the
petition puts the automatic stay into effect under § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.65 The automatic stay acts as a legislative injunction prohibiting certain
actions against the debtor, property of the debtor, and property of the bankruptcy
estate.66 The automatic stay also “ensures that all claims against the debtor will
be brought in a single forum, the bankruptcy court.”67
The automatic stay protects the interests of debtors and creditors. One
purpose of the automatic stay is to provide the debtor protection from creditors’
collection efforts.68 Another purpose is to protect “creditors as a class from the

61

Id.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
64 Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Haw. Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1993). The stay is
“designed to effect an immediate freeze of the status quo by precluding and nullifying post-petition actions,
judicial or nonjudicial, in nonbankruptcy fora against the debtor or affecting the property of the estate.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). As a result, “[t]he stay ensures that all claims against the debtor will be brought in a single
forum, the bankruptcy court.” Id.
65 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012); Soares v. Brockton Credit Union (In re Soares), 107 F.3d 969, 975 (1st Cir.
1997) (“The stay springs into being immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition . . . .”).
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (listing actions that would violate the stay). The stay “is intended to give the
debtor breathing room by ‘stop[ping] all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.’” In re
Soares, 107 F.3d at 975 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6296–97).
67 Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d at 585.
68 See In re Killmer, 501 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he automatic stay is often viewed as
a benefit to debtors since it provides a ‘breathing spell’ from collection efforts . . . .”); see also In re Soares, 107
F.3d at 975 (“The automatic stay is among the most basic of debtor protections under bankruptcy law.”).
62
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possibility that one creditor will obtain payment on its claims to the detriment of
all others.”69 A creditor or other party in interest may request relief from the
automatic stay for cause,70 and only the bankruptcy court may grant relief from
the automatic stay.71 The debtor has no power to waive the automatic stay
because the stay is designed to protect both creditors and debtors.72 If an act
violates the automatic stay, such acts are ordinarily deemed void ab initio.73
The automatic stay goes into effect upon filing a bankruptcy petition and
stays in effect against property of the estate “until such property is no longer
property of the estate.”74 Normally, property of the estate ceases to be property
of the estate if the trustee abandons the property, the bankruptcy case is
dismissed, or the trustee administers the property.75 However, undisclosed
lawsuits remain part of the bankruptcy estate indefinitely.76 As a result, even
after a debtor’s bankruptcy case is closed, the automatic stay continues to be in
effect against undisclosed lawsuits because they remain property of the estate
indefinitely.77

69 Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d at 585; see also Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1994)
(“The automatic stay . . . prevent[s] different creditors from bringing different proceedings in different courts,
thereby setting in motion a free-for-all in which opposing interests maneuver to capture the lion’s share of the
debtor’s assets.”).
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (“On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay . . . for cause . . . .”).
71 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
72 See Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (“Since the
purpose of the stay is to protect creditors as well as the debtor, the debtor may not waive the automatic stay.”);
see also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
73 See In re Enyedi, 371 B.R. 327, 334 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“It is well established in case law that acts
taken in violation of the automatic stay imposed under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code are deemed void
ab initio and lack effect.”); see also In re Killmer, 501 B.R. at 212 (“[A]n act entered in violation of the stay is
void whether or not a party makes a motion to declare it so.”).
74 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).
75 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
77 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1); Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 32 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2002) (Klein, J., concurring) (“[The] difficulty with the judicial estoppel defense is that the automatic stay
remains in effect to protect property of the estate so long as it is property of the estate, even after the bankruptcy
case is closed.”).
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C. Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts
Bankruptcy courts are Article I courts that serve as adjuncts to the district
courts.78 When Congress drafted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, one of the goals
was “to enlarge the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in order to eliminate the
serious delays, expense and duplications associated with the . . . dichotomy
between summary and plenary jurisdiction.”79 Congress granted federal districts
courts “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.”80 Under
28 U.S.C. § 157(a), “[e]ach district court may provide that any or all cases under
title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the
district.”81 All federal districts have adopted a local rule or standing order
referring cases under Title 11 to the bankruptcy courts.82
Congress also granted the federal district courts where a bankruptcy case is
commenced or is pending “exclusive jurisdiction” over “all the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of
property of the estate.”83 This broad grant of exclusive jurisdiction includes
determinations of what property becomes property of the estate.84 Because an
undisclosed lawsuit is property of the bankruptcy estate, the federal district court
and, by referral, the bankruptcy court have exclusive jurisdiction over
undisclosed lawsuits while the bankruptcy case is open.85

78 See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service
shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district.”); BP RE, L.P.
v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. (In re BP RE, L.P.), 735 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2013).
79 Noletto v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. (In re Noletto), 244 B.R. 845, 853 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 17–18 (1978)).
80 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2012).
81 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012).
82 See Schulman v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 366 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1996) (“[E]ach district is authorized to adopt a general order of reference to send all bankruptcy cases to the
bankruptcy judges for the district, and in fact all districts (including this district) have so ordered.”). For an
example of a local rule, see D. ARIZ. R. BANKR. P. 5011-1 (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the district court
refers to the bankruptcy court for this District all cases under Title 11 and all proceedings under Title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under Title 11.”).
83 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e). “The broad jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is designed to centralize
proceedings in the bankruptcy court . . . .” Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1994).
84 Rivera v. Rivera (In re Rivera), BAP No. OR-04-1596-MORK, 2005 WL 6960197, at *8 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. Sept. 14, 2005) (“Congress has given the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction to determine what is
property of the estate.”); In re Becker, 136 B.R. 113, 116 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (“[T]he question of what
constitutes property of a bankruptcy estate is ultimately a federal question.”).
85 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
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A bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is divided into core and non-core
proceedings.86 Bankruptcy courts may hear and enter final judgments in “all core
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.”87
Section 157(b)(2) of Title 28 provides sixteen non-exhaustive examples of core
proceedings, including “matters concerning the administration of the estate” and
“motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay.”88 In non-core
proceedings, bankruptcy courts may only “submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court,” and the district court judge must enter
the final order or judgment.89 Because an undisclosed lawsuit is property of the
bankruptcy estate, administering the lawsuit is a core proceeding and bankruptcy
judges may enter a final order or judgment.90
The statutory provisions defining property of the estate, the automatic stay,
and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction work in tandem to ensure that the
bankruptcy court can adequately protect the interests of debtors and creditors.
Because undisclosed lawsuits are property of the estate, consideration of each of
these provisions is necessary to properly address the role of judicial estoppel in
the undisclosed lawsuit context.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
The judicial estoppel doctrine can be traced backed to the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in Hamilton v. Zimmerman.91 The majority of
federal and state courts have since adopted judicial estoppel92 with the aim of
“protect[ing] the integrity of the judicial process.”93 When a court applies
86 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) (“The bankruptcy judge shall determine . . . whether a proceeding is a core
proceeding under this subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.”).
87 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 471 (2011).
88 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); Stern, 564 U.S. at 474.
89 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
90 See Johnson v. Lewis Cass Intermediate Sch. Dist. (In re Johnson), 345 B.R. 816, 818 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2006). In In re Johnson, the district court referred a debtor’s wrongful discharge claim to the bankruptcy
court after the defendant had filed for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. Id. at 818–19. The
bankruptcy court found that the adversary proceeding was a core proceeding because it involved “the
administration of the debtor’s estate and affect[ed] the liquidation of the assets of the estate and the debtorcreditor relationships.” Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
91 See 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39, 49 (1857) (dismissing a case because the plaintiff had made inconsistent
statements); Brian A. Dodd, Intent and the Application of Judicial Estoppel: Equitable Shield or Judicial
Heartbreak?, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 481, 481 (1998) (discussing the development of judicial estoppel).
92 See Dodd, supra note 91 (discussing the application of judicial estoppel in state and federal courts).
93 Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982). “The essential function of judicial
estoppel is to prevent intentional inconsistency; the object of the rule is to protect the judiciary, as an institution,
from the perversion of judicial machinery.” Id. at 599. The underlying policy considerations behind judicial
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judicial estoppel, it does so to prevent a party from misleading the courts.94
Although judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, its application can prove
harsh when used against a litigant who had no intention of undermining the
integrity of the courts or gaining an advantage.95 The extent to which a court
considers the litigant’s intent has caused “great division among the
jurisdictions.”96 This Part first discusses the goals of judicial estoppel and the
judicial estoppel factors delineated by the Supreme Court in New Hampshire v.
Maine.97 It then analyzes how federal courts apply judicial estoppel and
identifies the resulting inequities and inconsistencies. This Part concludes by
discussing issues that arise when state courts apply judicial estoppel in the
undisclosed lawsuit context.
A. The Judicial Estoppel Doctrine and Its Goals
Courts emphasize different purposes in applying the judicial estoppel
doctrine,98 and they also recognize that judicial estoppel cannot be reduced to a
strict formula.99 In 2001, the Supreme Court of the United States elaborated on
the judicial estoppel doctrine for the first time in New Hampshire v. Maine.100
The Court determined that the predominant purpose of judicial estoppel is “‘to
protect the integrity of the judicial process’ by ‘prohibiting parties from
deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.’”101
The Court identified three factors that “typically inform the decision whether
to apply the doctrine in a particular case.”102 The first factor is whether “a party’s
later position [is] ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its earlier position.”103 The second
factor is “whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that
estoppel include upholding the “sanctity of the oath,” preserving “the public confidence in the purity and
efficiency of judicial proceedings,” and preventing “a party from playing “fast and loose with the courts.”
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
94 See supra note 93.
95 See Dodd, supra note 91, at 481 (“Though founded on principles of equity and justice, the assertion of
judicial estoppel may potentially render a result that is both harsh and conceivably inequitable when levied
against an unwary litigant.”).
96 Id.
97 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001).
98 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 18B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4477 (2d ed. 2016) (“A
variety of purposes are pursued under the judicial estoppel banner . . . .”).
99 New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750.
100 Id. at 749 (noting that the Court had “not had occasion to discuss the doctrine elaborately” before New
Hampshire v. Maine).
101 Id. at 749–50 (citations omitted).
102 Id. at 750.
103 Id.
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party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in
a later proceeding would create ‘the perception that either the first or the second
court was misled.’”104 The third factor is “whether the party seeking to assert an
inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair
detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.”105 The Supreme Court noted
that these factors are not meant to “establish inflexible prerequisites or an
exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel.”106
Every federal circuit and some state courts apply the Maine factors.107
The Supreme Court’s decision in New Hampshire v. Maine was a starting
point for clarifying the doctrine of judicial estoppel. However, the Court left
many issues untouched and open to interpretation by the lower courts, including
the issue of the litigant’s intent.108 Judicial estoppel has continued to evolve in
federal and state courts, resulting in varied interpretations that reflect the
doctrine’s flexible standard and origin as a common-law doctrine that courts
may invoke at their discretion.109 The court applying judicial estoppel must
decide whether the judicial estoppel factors are met by interpreting
circumstances from litigation in the first court, which leads to increased
variability and possible error.110
Some courts have recognized that judicial estoppel is a harsh doctrine that
should be used only in extraordinary circumstances.111 Despite this recognition,
non-bankruptcy courts regularly apply judicial estoppel to undisclosed lawsuits

104

Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Id. at 751.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying the Maine
factors); Ex parte First Ala. Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1244–45 (Ala. 2003) (adopting the Maine factors).
108 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 98, § 4477 (“Judicial estoppel is not so much a single doctrine as a set
of doctrines that have not matured into fully coherent theory.”); see also New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751
(“Additional considerations may inform the doctrine’s application in specific factual contexts.”). The Supreme
Court noted in New Hampshire v. Maine that “it may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel
‘when a party’s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.’” Id. at 753.
109 See infra Part II.B–C.
110 See Debtors’ Counsel Beware, supra note 32, at 202 (noting that when two different courts are involved,
“there is room for interpretation, perhaps error, as to whether the position taken in the original court was actually,
or sufficiently, adopted, so as to justify the doctrine’s use”).
111 E.g., Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 784 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Judicial
estoppel ‘is an “extraordinary remedy”’ that should be employed only ‘“when a party’s inconsistent behavior
would otherwise result in a miscarriage of justice.”’ . . . [J]udicial estoppel ‘is often the harshest remedy’ that a
court can impose for inequitable conduct . . . .” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Lowery v. Stovall, 92
F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Because of the harsh results attendant with precluding a party from asserting a
position that would normally be available to the party, judicial estoppel must be applied with caution.”).
105
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from bankruptcy112 without considering other options.113 Non-bankruptcy courts
may be attracted to judicial estoppel because it offers a simple solution to a
complicated legal situation.114 What is evident is that the use of judicial estoppel
in the undisclosed lawsuit context has resulted in inequitable decisions115 as well
as discord throughout federal and state jurisdictions.116
B. Federal Courts’ Application of Judicial Estoppel
Every federal court of appeals that has addressed the application of judicial
estoppel to an undisclosed lawsuit from bankruptcy has found that “judicial
estoppel is justified to bar a debtor from pursuing a cause of action in district
court where that debtor deliberately fails to disclose the pending suit in a
bankruptcy case.”117 However, the circuits split on three important issues
involving judicial estoppel: the appropriate standard of review, application of
the Maine factors, and whether state or federal law applies when sitting in
diversity.
1. The Appropriate Standard of Review
To begin, the courts of appeals do not agree on the standard of review when
reviewing a grant of summary judgment decided on judicial estoppel grounds.118
Although a grant of summary judgment is usually reviewed de novo,119 the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits apply the abuse
112 See William H. Burgess, Dismissing Bankruptcy-Debtor Plaintiffs’ Cases on Judicial Estoppel Grounds,
FED. LAW., May 2015, at 54, 55. (“This issue—whether to judicially estop a plaintiff from continuing to
prosecute a lawsuit that was not disclosed in bankruptcy—appears to arise several times each week in the federal
and state courts.”); see also Christopher Klein, Lawrence Ponoroff & Sarah Borrey, Principles of Preclusion
and Estoppel in Bankruptcy Cases, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 839, 884 (2005) (commenting on the “beguiling lure of
judicial estoppel” in the undisclosed lawsuit context and noting that “succumb[ing] to the allure of this
position . . . has usually led to a dismissal of the action in a manner that contradicts the maxim that equity will
not do inequity—the resulting inequity being that creditors are punished for the debtor’s omission”).
113 See, e.g., White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 474, 484 (6th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the application of judicial estoppel to an undisclosed lawsuit without considering any alternatives).
114 See Klein, Ponoroff & Borrey, supra note 112, at 884.
115 Id. (noting that judicial estoppel harms innocent creditors).
116 See infra Part II.B–C.
117 Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 798 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the federal circuits’
application of judicial estoppel to undisclosed lawsuits).
118 See Lia v. Saporito, 541 F. App’x 71, 72 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[C]ircuits are split as to whether dismissal
on grounds of judicial estoppel should be reviewed de novo . . . .”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2305 (2014); see also
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying the abuse of discretion standard).
But see United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying de novo standard of review).
119 See Dunn v. Advanced Med. Specialties, Inc., 556 F. App’x 785, 788 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n order
granting summary judgment typically is subject to de novo review . . . .”).
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of discretion standard when reviewing a grant of summary judgment based on
judicial estoppel.120 The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits apply a de
novo standard of review when reviewing a grant of summary judgment based on
judicial estoppel.121
2. Applying the Maine Factors in the Undisclosed Lawsuit Context
Federal courts also disagree on how to apply the Maine factors. Following
the Supreme Court’s decision in New Hampshire v. Maine, federal courts began
attempting to apply the factors according to the Court’s instruction that the
factors “do not establish inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for
determining the applicability of judicial estoppel.”122 Despite this explicit
instruction, some federal courts apply the Maine factors to undisclosed lawsuits
from bankruptcy in a strict, formulaic way.123
The Maine factors are often satisfied in a typical case involving an
undisclosed lawsuit.124 The first Maine factor focuses on whether the debtor has
taken inconsistent positions.125 In reviewing the first factor, courts often find that
factor is satisfied because the debtor failed to disclose a prepetition lawsuit.126
In EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district
court’s application of the Maine factors to a debtor’s failure to disclose an
employment discrimination claim.127 The Eighth Circuit found that “‘[i]n the
bankruptcy context, a party may be judicially estopped from asserting a cause of
120 See Ah Quin v. Cty. of Kauai Dep’t of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013); Love v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2012); Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010);
Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R., 493 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007); Stallings, 447 F.3d at 1046; Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 137 F. App’x 529, 530 (4th Cir. 2005); Alternative Sys.
Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2004); McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610,
616–17 (3d Cir. 1996).
121 See, e.g., Lia, 541 F. App’x at 72 n.1; Solomon v. Vilsack, 628 F.3d 555, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Eubanks
v. CBSK Fin. Grp., 385 F.3d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 2004); Hook, 195 F.3d at 305.
122 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 (2001); see also, e.g., Ah Quin, 733 F.3d at 270 (applying
the Maine factors); EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 679 (8th Cir.) (applying the Maine
factors), reh’g denied (8th Cir. 2012); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1273 (applying the Maine factors).
123 See Ah Quin, 733 F.3d at 271 (“In the bankruptcy context, the federal courts have developed a basic
default rule: If a plaintiff-debtor omits a pending (or soon-to-be-filed) lawsuit from the bankruptcy schedules
and obtains a discharge (or plan confirmation), judicial estoppel bars the action.” (emphasis added)).
124 See, e.g., Ibok v. SIAC-Sector Inc., 470 F. App’x 27, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that judicial estoppel “is
commonly applied in order ‘to prevent a party who failed to disclose a claim in bankruptcy proceedings from
asserting that claim after emerging from bankruptcy’”); Love, 677 F.3d at 261–62 (noting that that judicial
estoppel is “particularly appropriate” in the undisclosed lawsuit from bankruptcy context).
125 New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750.
126 CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 679.
127 Id. at 679–80.
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action’ . . . because ‘a debtor’s failure to list a claim in the mandatory bankruptcy
filings is tantamount to a representation that no such claim existed.’”128
The second Maine factor focuses on whether the bankruptcy court accepted
the debtor’s inconsistent position.129 Courts may find that the second factor is
satisfied when a Chapter 7 debtor receives a full discharge in bankruptcy.130 In
CRST Van Expedited, Inc., the Eighth Circuit found that the second factor
“might be satisfied ‘where the bankruptcy court issues a “no asset” discharge,’
thereby evidencing that ‘the bankruptcy court has effectively adopted the
debtor’s position.’”131
The third Maine factor focuses on whether the debtor gains an unfair
advantage.132 Under this third factor, courts often conclude that not disclosing a
claim in bankruptcy gives the debtor an unfair advantage over his creditors.133
In Moses v. Howard University Hospital, the D.C. Circuit found that by filing a
lawsuit “without disclosing it in his bankruptcy proceedings, [the debtor] set up
a situation in which he could gain an advantage over his creditors.”134
In addition to the Maine factors, federal courts may consider the debtor’s
motive in concealing the claim by determining whether the debtor’s failure to
disclose the lawsuit was a result of inadvertence or mistake.135 The federal courts
discuss the issue of a good-faith mistake either under the third Maine factor136
or as a separate consideration.137 In CRST Van Expedited, Inc., the Eighth Circuit
stressed that “a district court should not judicially estop a debtor whose prior

128

Id.
New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750.
130 E.g., CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 679.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 E.g., Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The First Circuit does not
require a showing of unfair advantage; however, where courts find an unfair advantage, the First Circuit
considers this a strong factor in favor of applying judicial estoppel. Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 16–17 (1st
Cir. 2012).
134 Moses, 606 F.3d at 799.
135 E.g., Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court recognized that
“it may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel ‘when a party’s prior position was based on
inadvertence or mistake.’” New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 753 (quoting John S. Clark Co. v. Faggert & Frieden,
P.C., 65 F.3d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1995)). Courts also discuss the debtor’s mistake in not disclosing a claim in terms
of good or bad faith. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 680 (finding “no evidence of any such good-faith
error or omission”).
136 E.g., CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 680.
137 E.g., Ah Quin v. Cty. of Kauai Dep’t of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the
debtor’s inadvertence or mistake separate from the three Maine factors).
129
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inconsistent position was attributable to ‘a good-faith mistake rather than as part
of a scheme to mislead the court.’”138
In addressing whether the mistake was made in good faith, some circuits
apply a presumption of intentional manipulation when a debtor fails to disclose
a claim in his bankruptcy case.139 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that there is an
“ever present motive to conceal legal claims and reap the financial rewards,”
which “undoubtedly is why so many of the cases applying judicial estoppel
involve debtors-turned-plaintiffs who have failed to disclose such claims in
bankruptcy.”140 The Ninth Circuit recognizes this presumption and allows a
“narrow exception for good faith” when the debtor has not reopened his
bankruptcy case to amend his schedules.141 The Fifth Circuit has similarly found
that debtors have a motive to conceal because they stand to receive a windfall
by not disclosing the claim in bankruptcy.142 The Tenth Circuit has agreed with
this presumption and found that a debtor’s failure to disclose a claim in
bankruptcy can only be deemed a mistake when the debtor has no knowledge of
the claim or has no motive to conceal the claim.143
Federal courts’ application of the Maine factors and other considerations
often results in reducing judicial estoppel to a checklist or default rule when the

138

CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d at 680 (quoting Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1049
(8th Cir. 2006)) (finding that there was no evidence that the debtor’s mistake was made in good faith and holding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in judicially estopping the debtors’ claims).
139 E.g., Ah Quin, 733 F.3d at 272–73 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In sum, given the strong need for full disclosure in
bankruptcy proceedings and the fact that the plaintiff-debtor received an unfair advantage in the bankruptcy
court, it makes sense to apply a presumption of deliberate manipulation.”); Love, 677 F.3d at 262; Eastman v.
Union Pac. R.R., 493 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit in Ah Quin distinguished the situation
where the debtor had successfully reopened her bankruptcy case and amended her bankruptcy schedules because
in such a situation, “two of the three primary New Hampshire factors are no longer met.” 733 F.3d at 274.
Accordingly, when a debtor reopens her bankruptcy case and amends her schedules, the Ninth Circuit does not
apply “a presumption of deceit.” Id. at 276 (emphasis omitted). It instead “requires an inquiry into whether the
plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing was, in fact, inadvertent or mistaken, as those terms are commonly understood.” Id.
140 Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1159.
141 Ah Quin, 733 F.3d at 272.
142 Love, 677 F.3d at 262 (“[T]he motivation sub-element is almost always met if a debtor fails to disclose
a claim or possible claim to the bankruptcy court. Motivation in this context is self-evident because of potential
financial benefit resulting from the nondisclosure.” (quoting Thompson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., No.
3:04CV837-WHB-JCS, 2006 WL 7089989, at *4 (S.D. Miss. May 31, 2006))).
143 Queen v. TA Operating, LLC, 734 F.3d 1081, 1093–94 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t was to [the debtors’]
benefit to conceal the claim so that they could receive a full discharge in bankruptcy before proceeding with the
lawsuit, because this would allow them to pursue an award for damages without the risk that any of the award
would go to their creditors.”).
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case involves an undisclosed lawsuit from bankruptcy.144 Some federal courts
have recognized alternatives to judicial estoppel in the undisclosed lawsuit
context.145 For example, in Willess v. United States, the Tenth Circuit found that
the trustee was the real party in interest and did not dismiss the debtor-plaintiff’s
lawsuit on judicial estoppel grounds.146 However, other federal courts continue
to apply judicial estoppel without regard to possible alternatives.147
Some circuits that apply judicial estoppel strictly now face dissenting
opinions on this issue.148 In Robinson v. District of Columbia, a district court
within the D.C. Circuit recently recognized that “alternative mechanisms exist
to more equitably protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system (and prevent
undue benefit to the debtor) than the harsh rule imposed by judicial estoppel as
generally construed.”149 However, the Court could not adopt this approach
because it was bound by precedent.150 In Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Judge
Anderson expressed concern over the Eleventh Circuit’s test for judicial
estoppel, fearing that the Circuit had “created an inflexible formula for
‘inadvertence’ that prevents courts from thoroughly examining all of the
circumstances of a particular case.”151 Judge Anderson concurred in the
judgment because he “believe[d] [he was] bound to do so by precedent.”152 Most

144 See Ah Quin, 733 F.3d at 271 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that “the federal courts have developed a basic
default rule” in the undisclosed lawsuit context); see also Lupian v. Cent. Valley Residential Builders, L.P., No.
10CV2270-LAB (WVG), 2014 WL 465445, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2014) (“There’s no doubt that, as a general
rule, a debtor who neglects to disclose a contingent and unliquidated claim in a bankruptcy petition is judicially
estopped from pursuing that claim after being discharged from bankruptcy.”); Rivera v. JP Morgan Chase Bank
(In re Rivera), No. 13-14351-BFK, 2014 WL 287517, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 27, 2014) (“Where a debtor
fails to list a potential claim, and fails to amend her Schedules when the claim becomes known, the first three
elements of judicial estoppel are generally met.”).
145 See Willess v. United States, 560 F. App’x 762, 764 (10th Cir.) (finding that the trustee of the bankruptcy
estate is the real party in interest and that the debtor lacks standing to bring the claim), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
202, and reh’g denied, 135 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Gallagher v. Makowski, No. 13-1103 (JEI/AMD), 2014 WL
1296431, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014) (finding that judicial estoppel was not appropriate and that “[t]he Trustee
may elect to pursue this claim or he may not,” but “[i]f the Trustee chooses to abandon the claim, then [the
plaintiff] may continue to pursue the claim in her own right”).
146 Willess, 560 F. App’x at 764.
147 See, e.g., White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 474, 484 (6th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the application of judicial estoppel to an undisclosed lawsuit without considering any alternatives).
In White, Judge Clay noted “[t]he majority’s approach to this case fails to appreciate the absurdity of the result
of its erroneous application of judicial estoppel.” Id. at 484 (Clay, J., dissenting).
148 See, e.g., supra note 147.
149 Robinson v. District of Columbia, 10 F. Supp. 3d 181, 190 n.9 (D.D.C. 2014).
150 See id. (noting that the Court could not hold that reopening the bankruptcy proceeding would cure the
debtor’s wrongful non-disclosure due to precedent).
151 Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 2010) (Anderson, J., concurring).
152 Id. at 1278 (Anderson, J., concurring).

WANG GALLEYPROOFS3

1230

6/7/2017 9:50 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1209

recently, in Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., Judge Tjoflat wrote a lengthy concurrence
encouraging the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider en banc its judicial estoppel
doctrine in the undisclosed lawsuit context.153
3. Choice of Law when Sitting in Diversity
The federal circuits also disagree on whether to apply state or federal judicial
estoppel standards when sitting in diversity.154 In cases involving an undisclosed
lawsuit from bankruptcy, some cases are heard in federal court based on federal
question jurisdiction,155 and other cases are based on diversity jurisdiction.156
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits apply state standards of judicial estoppel when
the jurisdiction of the case is based on diversity.157 The Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits apply federal judicial estoppel
standards when the jurisdiction of the case is based on diversity.158 The First and
Second Circuits have not decided whether to apply federal or state standards of
judicial estoppel, but district courts in both circuits have applied federal law.159

153

Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Ins., 586 F.3d 247, 261 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying federal judicial
estoppel standards in a diversity case); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 602–04 (9th
Cir. 1996) (discussing whether federal circuits apply state or federal judicial estoppel standards in a diversity
case); Monterey Dev. Corp. v. Lawyer’s Title Ins., 4 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying state judicial
estoppel standards in a diversity case).
155 See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 664 (8th Cir. 2012) (hearing a claim arising
under federal law).
156 See, e.g., G-I Holdings, Inc., 586 F.3d at 253 (“The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332 . . . .”).
157 E.g., Spencer v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 757 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2014); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assocs., 44 F.3d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1995).
158 E.g., Watkins v. Bailey, 484 F. App’x 18, 20 n.1 (6th Cir. 2012); Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606
F.3d 789, 797–98 (D.C. Cir. 2010); G-I Holdings, Inc., 586 F.3d at 261; Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R., 493 F.3d
1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007); Jarrard v. CDI Telecomms., Inc., 408 F.3d 905, 914 (7th Cir. 2005); Hall v. GE
Plastic Pac. PTE Ltd., 327 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 603–04; Guinness PLC v. Ward,
955 F.2d 875, 899 n.20 (4th Cir. 1992).
159 See, e.g., Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2004). In Alternative
Sys. Concepts, the First Circuit applied federal standards of judicial estoppel because the parties agreed about
what law to apply, but also noted that it “would likely reach this same conclusion even without the parties’
acquiescent behavior.” Id. The First Circuit noted that “[i]t has long been held that federal courts may bypass
conflicting state rules of decision in favor of federal standards when positive considerations, such as the presence
of a strong federal policy, militate in favor of employing federal standards.” Id. District courts in the Second
Circuit have applied federal judicial estoppel law under the impression that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
had previously ruled on the matter. See, e.g., Laskowski v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins., No. 5:11-CV-340 (GLS/ATB),
2012 WL 2120089, at *3 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012) (citing Stichting Ter Behartiging Van de Belangen Van
Oudaandeelhouders In Het Kapitaal Van Saybolt Int’l B.V. v. Schreiber, 407 F.3d 34, 45 (2d Cir. 2005)) (finding
that the Second Circuit “has endorsed the application of the federal judicial estoppel doctrine to diversity cases”).
154
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The circuits that apply federal law often do so because judicial estoppel is
meant to protect the integrity of the judicial system, and “federal courts must be
free to develop principles that most adequately serve their institutional
interests.”160 The circuits applying federal law also find that “the interests of the
second court are uniquely implicated and threatened by the taking of an
incompatible position,” which is “quite [a] strong ‘affirmative countervailing
consideration’ of federal policy weighing in favor of the application of federal
law.”161 When a federal court sitting in diversity applies judicial estoppel in the
undisclosed lawsuit context, federal policies weigh heavily in favor of applying
federal law because both courts implicated in the analysis are federal.162
Although federal courts that apply federal law have supported their position,
the circuits that apply state law have done so without much explanation.163 The
Eighth Circuit first applied state judicial estoppel standards in Monterey
Development Corp. v. Lawyer’s Title Insurance, finding that because the court
was sitting in diversity, “[it] must apply the substantive law of Missouri.”164 The
Eighth Circuit continues to follow its precedent in Monterey Development Corp.
without elaborating on its decision to use state judicial estoppel standards.165 In
the Eleventh Circuit, the application of state law judicial estoppel standards has

160

Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins., 690 F.2d 595, 598 n.4 (6th Cir.1982); see also Ryan Operations G.P. v.
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (“A federal court’s ability to protect itself
from manipulation by litigants should not vary according to the law of the state in which the underlying dispute
arose.”).
161 Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 604 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)). The
federal court “is the court where the judicial estoppel defense arises” and also “the court interested in protecting
its process.” Eastman, 493 F.3d at 1156.
162 See Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc., 374 F.3d at 32 (“Where . . . both the putatively estopping conduct
and the putatively estopped conduct occur in a federal case, a federal court has a powerful institutional interest
in applying federally-developed principles to protect itself against cynical manipulations.”); Hall, 327 F.3d at
395–96 (“[T]he application of federal law concerning judicial estoppel is appropriate in this case because both
suits filed by Hall ended up in federal court and it is the federal court that is subject to manipulation and in need
of protection.”).
163 See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assocs., 44 F.3d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1995)
(stating without explanation that when sitting in diversity, “the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is
governed by state law”); Monterey Dev. Corp. v. Lawyer’s Title Ins., 4 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1993).
164 See Monterey Dev. Corp., 4 F.3d at 608.
165 See Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Soczynski, 765 F.3d 931, 935 n.3 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Monterey
Dev. Corp., 4 F.3d at 608–09) (“Courts in our circuit are bound to apply state law elements of judicial estoppel
in a diversity case.”); Spencer v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 757 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Monterey Dev.
Corp., 4 F.3d at 608–09) (finding that the Eighth Circuit’s “precedent calls for the application of state law
elements of judicial estoppel in diversity cases”).
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caused even more confusion because Georgia state courts find that federal law
governs when applying judicial estoppel in the undisclosed lawsuit context.166
C. State Courts’ Application of Judicial Estoppel
The application of judicial estoppel to undisclosed lawsuits from bankruptcy
has become more popular in state courts over the past fifteen years. Before 2001,
courts in twenty-five states had applied judicial estoppel in the undisclosed
lawsuit context.167 Since 2001, thirteen additional states and the District of
Columbia have applied judicial estoppel in this context.168 Despite the growing
popularity, Vermont state courts do not recognize the doctrine of judicial
estoppel in any context.169 This section first discusses the varying judicial
estoppel doctrines adopted by state courts and the choice of law issue in the
undisclosed lawsuit context. It then analyzes the jurisdictional issue that arises
if the debtor-plaintiff’s bankruptcy case is pending.
1. Judicial Estoppel and Choice of Law
Although most state courts have their own doctrine of judicial estoppel,170
many of those state courts’ judicial estoppel doctrines are informed by federal

166 See Thompson v. Quarles, 392 B.R. 517, 526 n.10 (S.D. Ga. 2008). In Thompson, the District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia noted that it was “in something of a legal quandary regarding the application of
the judicial estoppel doctrine” because “in cases involving debtors with unscheduled causes of action, the
Georgia state courts take the view that judicial estoppel is a federal doctrine.” Id.
167 See Debtors’ Counsel Beware, supra note 32, at 228–42 (surveying state courts’ application of judicial
estoppel).
168 See Verde Valley Plaza, LLC v. Stoneking, No. 1 CA-CV 14-0160, 2015 WL 5084111, at *4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 2015); Dupwe v. Wallace, 140 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Ark. 2004); Darden v. New Castle Motors, Inc.,
No. CV N12C-01-219 FSS, 2014 WL 1392969, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2014), aff’d, 103 A.3d 515 (Del.
2014); Atkins v. 4940 Wisconsin, LLC, 93 A.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C. 2014); A & J Constr. Co. v. Wood, 116 P.3d
12, 18 (Idaho 2005); Miller v. Conagra, Inc., 991 So. 2d 445, 452 (La. 2008); Spohn v. Van Dyke Pub. Sch., 822
N.W.2d 239, 252 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Kirk v. Pope, 973 So. 2d 981, 992 (Miss. 2007); Strable v. Union Pac.
R.R., 396 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Pack v. Ryan, 238 P.3d 844 (Nev. 2008); Marquez v. Drew,
No. A-0171-08T2, 2009 WL 3460682, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2009); Something More, LLC
v. Weatherford News, Inc., 310 P.3d 1106, 1108 (Okla. Civ. App.), reh’g denied (Okla. Civ. App. 2013); Bentley
Funding Grp. v. SK & R Grp., 609 S.E.2d 49, 54 (Va. 2005); Omegbu v. Nicholson, 698 N.W.2d 132, ¶ 12,
(Wis. 2005).
169 See supra note 11.
170 See, e.g., Dupwe, 140 S.W.3d at 471. After a detailed discussion of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the doctrine was “merely a continuation of existing law previously set
out under the doctrine against inconsistent positions.” Id.
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law.171 For example, in Ex parte First Alabama Bank, the Supreme Court of
Alabama “embrace[d] the factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine and
join[ed] the mainstream of jurisprudence in dealing with the doctrine of judicial
estoppel.”172
Most state courts apply their state law doctrine of judicial estoppel in the
undisclosed lawsuit context.173 When state courts apply judicial estoppel to
federal claims, they confront similar issues that federal courts face when sitting
in diversity and handling state law claims.174 Like the majority of federal
circuits, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that state law should govern
because “[t]he primary purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is to protect
the integrity of [the state’s] judicial system.”175 Only five state courts have
explicitly applied federal law in the undisclosed lawsuit context.176
2. Jurisdictional Issue in the Undisclosed Lawsuit Context
A potential issue with state courts applying judicial estoppel in the
undisclosed lawsuit context is one of jurisdiction.177 Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(e)(1), the federal district court and, by referral, the bankruptcy court,
have exclusive jurisdiction over property of the debtor and property of the
171 See Vincent v. First Ala. Bank (Ex parte First Ala. Bank), 883 So. 2d 1236, 1244 (Ala. 2003) (applying
the Maine factors); see also Ass’n Res., Inc. v. Wall, 2 A.3d 873, 890–91 (Conn. 2010) (turning “for guidance
to the significant body of federal case law addressing this doctrine”).
172 Ex parte First Ala. Bank, 883 So. 2d at 1246.
173 See, e.g., Verde Valley Plaza, LLC, 2015 WL 5084111, at *4 (applying the Arizona judicial estoppel
doctrine in the undisclosed lawsuit context); Gottlieb v. Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 19 (Cal Ct. App.) (applying the
California judicial estoppel doctrine in the omitted asset context), review denied (Cal. 2006).
174 See Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., 979 So. 2d 53, 58 (Ala. 2007). The Supreme Court of Alabama
noted that “[t]he issue whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel is substantive or procedural in nature has arisen
most often in cases where federal courts have applied state law under the Erie doctrine.” Id.
175 Id. at 60.
176 See IBF Participating Income Fund v. Dillard-Winecoff, LLC, 573 S.E.2d 58, 59 (Ga. 2002) (“Georgia
appellate courts historically have striven to apply the ‘federal’ doctrine of judicial estoppel, in an effort ‘to afford
the judgment of the bankruptcy court the same effect here as would result in the court where that judgment was
rendered.’” (quoting Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 442 S.E.2d 265, 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)));
Miller v. Conagra, Inc., 991 So. 2d 445, 452 (La. 2008); Kirk v. Pope, 973 So. 2d 981, 991 (Miss. 2007); Dallas
Sales Co. v. Carlisle Silver Co., 134 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App. 2004) (“[T]he federal law of judicial estoppel
applies in a case in which the prior proceeding was in federal bankruptcy court.”); Omegbu v. Nicholson, 698
N.W.2d 132, ¶ 11 (Wis. 2005) (“[B]ecause the argument for judicial estoppel arose in the context of Omegbu’s
bankruptcy petition, federal law presumably applies.”).
177 See Debtors’ Counsel Beware, supra note 32, at 215 (“[S]tate court practices raise a question regarding
whether those state courts strictly applying judicial estoppel have the authority to determine whether a claim of
the debtor is property of the bankruptcy estate. Although determinations of estate property often turn upon state
law issues, typically it is the bankruptcy court that decides what comprises property of the bankruptcy estate.”
(footnote omitted)).
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estate.178 Although “[s]tate law normally determines the extent of the debtor’s
interest in property[;] . . . [b]ankruptcy law determines whether that interest is
property of the estate.”179 When courts apply judicial estoppel in the undisclosed
lawsuit context, their application of the doctrine is predicated on the fact that the
undisclosed lawsuit is property of the estate.180 In the event that the debtor’s
bankruptcy case is still pending or has been reopened, the state court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether a claim is property of a
bankruptcy estate.181 Moreover, if a bankruptcy case is open or pending, state
courts lack jurisdiction over assets that are property of the estate; therefore, state
courts may not dismiss a lawsuit that is property of the estate on any ground—
including judicial estoppel.182
III. ALTERNATIVES TO JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Non-bankruptcy courts do not always turn to judicial estoppel in the
undisclosed lawsuit context. This Part considers alternative approaches to
judicial estoppel in the undisclosed lawsuit context and how they may create the
same inequitable results as judicial estoppel. First, this Part discusses the issue
of a debtor-plaintiff’s lack of standing to pursue a lawsuit not disclosed in
bankruptcy. This Part then explores the option of reopening a debtor-plaintiff’s
bankruptcy case to amend her bankruptcy schedules.

178 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2012) (“The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or
is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate . . . .”); Probulk Inc. v. North of Eng. Protecting &
Indem. Ass’n (In re Probulk Inc.), 407 B.R. 56, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the scope of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(e)(1)).
179 Winick & Rich, P.C. v. Strada Design Assocs. (In re Strada Design Assocs.), 326 B.R. 229, 235 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Coben v. Lebrun (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 37 B.R. 167, 169
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984) (“[F]ederal bankruptcy law dictates if the interest is property of the estate.”).
180 See, e.g., Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (considering
whether the undisclosed lawsuit was property of the estate before applying judicial estoppel).
181 See John Knox Vill. v. Fortis Constr. Co., 449 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Mo. Ct. App.), reh’g denied, transfer
denied (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). In John Knox Village, the appellants asked a Missouri court of appeals to determine
that the appellee’s claim was property of a bankruptcy estate. Id. The court found that it had “no authority to
make such a finding” because “the bankruptcy court ‘has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether certain
property is property of the bankruptcy estate.’” Id. (quoting True v. True (In re True), 285 B.R. 405, 412 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 2002) (emphasis omitted).
182 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (granting federal courts “exclusive jurisdiction” over property of the estate);
see also State ex rel. Laughlin v. Bowersox, 318 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (“[N]o state . . . can
grant subject matter jurisdiction to its courts to hear matters that federal law places under the ‘exclusive’
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
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A. The Debtor Is Not the Real Party in Interest
Standing “is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the
power of the court to entertain the suit.”183 Standing is a jurisdictional
requirement that can be reviewed at any time throughout the litigation of a
claim.184 To meet this requirement, a plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties.”185 Related to standing is the question of who may bring a lawsuit
in federal court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides that “[a]n action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”186 In this context,
some courts have concluded that the Chapter 7 trustee, not the debtor-plaintiff,
is the real party in interest.187 Defendants have argued for dismissal under both
the judicial estoppel doctrine and the debtor-plaintiff’s lack of standing.188
The Chapter 7 trustee is the real party in interest in the undisclosed lawsuit
context. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that nearly all of a
debtor’s prepetition assets vest in the bankruptcy estate as of the commencement
of a case.189 Any undisclosed lawsuit becomes part of the bankruptcy estate and
remains a part of the bankruptcy estate post-bankruptcy.190 When an asset
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor no longer has rights in that
asset unless the asset is abandoned under § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code or the
case is dismissed.191 Section 323 of the Bankruptcy Code confers upon the
trustee, as “the representative of the estate,”192 the power “to sue and be sued.”193
Thus, the debtor is not the real party in interest to pursue an undisclosed

183

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994).
185 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
186 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
187 E.g., Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004).
188 See, e.g., Longaker v. Boston Sci. Corp., 715 F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Boston Scientific moved
to dismiss Longaker’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that
Longaker lacked standing to bring either claim, [and] that judicial estoppel barred the breach of contract
claim . . . .”).
189 See Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 (“Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that virtually all of a
debtor’s assets, both tangible and intangible, vest in the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.”).
190 See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
192 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2012).
193 11 U.S.C. § 323(b).
184
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lawsuit194 because the trustee “is the proper party in interest, and is the only party
with standing to prosecute causes of action belonging to the estate.”195
Under this rationale, courts have determined that the debtor-plaintiff “lacks
standing” to bring the lawsuit196 and dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is the appropriate solution.197 Because courts have characterized this
dismissal as a dismissal for lack of standing,198 courts have also overlooked the
inherent protection of Federal Rule 17 in preventing dismissal of the claim if the
real party in interest has not been given an opportunity to intervene.199 Federal
Rule 17(a)(3) provides that a “court may not dismiss an action for failure to
prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a
reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or
be substituted into the action.”200 Where a debtor-plaintiff’s bankruptcy case has
been closed, the debtor must move the bankruptcy court to reopen her
bankruptcy case and then request that the court appoint a trustee who could then
intervene in the lawsuit. However, if the non-bankruptcy court dismisses the
action before the debtor-plaintiff can petition the bankruptcy court, the debtorplaintiff may never return to the bankruptcy court.
Even where a non-bankruptcy court determines that the debtor-plaintiff has
standing but is not the real party in interest, the court may use its discretion to
dismiss the case without substituting the real party in interest. In Feist v.
Consolidated Freightways, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recognized that the debtor-plaintiff had standing, but was not the

194 Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 (“Generally speaking, a pre-petition cause of action is the property of the
Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing to pursue it.”); Klein, Ponoroff &
Borrey, supra note 112, at 884 (“[T]he real problem is that the debtor is not the real party in interest and lacks
standing to prosecute an action that is property of the estate.”).
195 Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272.
196 E.g., id.
197 See, e.g., Longaker v. Boston Sci. Corp., 715 F.3d 658, 659–60, 663 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal of the debtor-plaintiff’s claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(1) on the ground that the
debtor-plaintiff lacked standing).
198 There is disagreement as to whether the issue is the debtor-plaintiff’s standing. In Longaker, Judge Bye
dissented, finding that the majority opinion’s conclusion regarding the debtor-plaintiff’s standing “erroneously
conflates standing with the validity of Longaker’s cause of action.” Id. at 664 (Bye, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Bye would have found that the debtor-plaintiff adequately “show[ed] an ‘injury in fact’
that is ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant’ and likely to be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’” Id. at 663 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). If the debtorplaintiff has standing but is not the real party in interest, the appropriate action by the non-bankruptcy court
would be following Federal Rule 17(a)(3). See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(3).
199 See, e.g., Longaker, 715 F.3d 658.
200 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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real party in interest under Federal Rule 17.201 Before substituting the real party
in interest (the Chapter 7 trustee), the court found that it should consider the
debtor-plaintiff’s good faith in filing the lawsuit.202 Even after the trustee argued
that the creditors would be the ones to suffer from a dismissal,203 the court found
that it should dismiss the lawsuit due to the debtor-plaintiff’s failure to prove
that not disclosing his lawsuit in his bankruptcy case was an honest mistake.204
The actions of this district court further highlight non-bankruptcy courts’
misguided reliance on debtor-plaintiffs’ good faith at the expense of the
bankruptcy system’s goal of ensuring a fair distribution of a debtor’s assets to
creditors.205
Dismissing a debtor-plaintiff’s lawsuit because she lacks standing or is not
the real party in interest can have the same harsh and inequitable outcome as
applying judicial estoppel.206 The harsh outcome clearly results where the trustee
is not permitted to intervene. It also results where the bankruptcy court does not
receive notice regarding the undisclosed lawsuit. If the bankruptcy court is
unaware of the lawsuit, the court cannot appoint a trustee to pursue the lawsuit
for the benefit of the creditors.207 This issue of notice is also relevant when a
non-bankruptcy court dismisses a debtor-plaintiff’s lawsuit based on judicial
estoppel. The debtor-plaintiff may not see the incentive of providing notice to
the bankruptcy court or petitioning the bankruptcy court to reopen the
bankruptcy case because the bankruptcy court could prevent her from receiving

201

100 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 216 F.3d 1075 (3d Cir. 2000).
See id. at 276 (“If Plaintiff did not make an honest and understandable mistake when he filed this action
in his own name, this Court will not allow substitution of the real party in interest.”)
203 See id. at 280 (“[I]f substitution is not permitted in this case, it is Plaintiff’s creditors who will suffer
most, as they received nothing during his original bankruptcy case and could receive nothing now.”).
204 Id.
205 Id. (“This Court will not come to the aid of a plaintiff under circumstances such as this where plaintiff
cannot prove that his prior actions were done in good faith.”). In balancing the interests of the creditors with the
court’s interest in preventing the debtor-plaintiff from benefitting from his bad faith actions, the court found that
the interest of the “creditors in recovering some of the debts owed to them is not sufficient to justify substitution
of the bankruptcy trustee as the real party in interest in this case.” Id.
206 See supra Part II.B.
207 See infra note 217 and accompanying text. Another issue that arises is whether a non-bankruptcy court
could also estop the trustee from bringing the claim. The federal courts of appeals are split on this issue. Compare
Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571, 579 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n innocent bankruptcy trustee may pursue for
the benefit of creditors a judgment or cause of action that the debtor—having concealed that asset during
bankruptcy—is himself estopped from pursuing.”), with Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1293
(11th Cir. 2003) (allowing the trustee to replace the debtor-plaintiff as the real party in interest, but still estopping
the monetary claims).
202
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any of the monetary benefit.208 Moreover, a debtor petitioning to reopen her
bankruptcy case must consider other possible negative consequences. For failing
to disclose a potential lawsuit in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court can sanction
the debtor209 or revoke the debtor’s discharge.210 Thus, the debtor-plaintiff may
not voluntarily return to the bankruptcy court in either context, harming the
creditors and disrupting the functions of the bankruptcy court.211
B. Reopening the Debtor’s Bankruptcy Case
Despite the potential negative consequences, some debtor-plaintiffs petition
the bankruptcy court to reopen the bankruptcy case212 and thereby request that
the court appoint a new trustee.213 The debtor-plaintiffs then seek to have the
trustee intervene in the lawsuit.214
Bankruptcy courts have discretion to reopen a bankruptcy case.215 After an
estate has been fully administered, the court discharges the trustee and closes the
case.216 After the court closes a case, the case may be reopened in the same court
to “administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”217
208 See Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 30 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (“If a debtor
shows bad faith, or if third parties are prejudiced by nondisclosure of an asset, then the bankruptcy court can
exercise its discretion to disallow any claimed exemption in the asset, in whole or in part.”). At least one court
has found that the issue of whether a debtor-plaintiff’s “damages should be limited to the amount owed to his
creditors in his bankruptcy case is an issue within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.” Korti v. A.W.
Holdings, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-63, 2014 WL 793360, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 26, 2014).
209 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Griner (In re Griner), 240 B.R. 432, 439 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1999) (“A
bankruptcy court has ample powers to punish debtors who wrongfully conceal assets, i.e., sanctions . . . .”).
210 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(2) (2012) (“[T]he court shall revoke a discharge . . . if . . . the debtor acquired
property that is property of the estate . . . and knowingly and fraudulently failed to report the acquisition of or
entitlement to such property, or to deliver or surrender such property to the trustee . . . .”).
211 See infra Part IV.A.
212 See, e.g., Barger, 348 F.3d at 1291–92 (discussing the actions of a debtor-plaintiff who moved to reopen
her bankruptcy case after the defendant in the lawsuit raised the judicial estoppel defense).
213 See, e.g., In re Lopez, 283 B.R. at 32 (“If the purpose of the reopening is to deal with unscheduled assets
as property of the estate, then it is per se an abuse of discretion not to order appointment of a trustee.”).
214 See, e.g., Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[The trustee] moved to
intervene in this case or, alternatively, for substitution as the real party in interest.”).
215 See Debtors’ Counsel Beware, supra note 32, at 206 (“Reopening of closed cases is discretionary with
the bankruptcy court . . . .”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2012) (“A case may be reopened in the court in which
such case was closed . . . .”).
216 See 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) (“After an estate is fully administered and the court has discharged the trustee,
the court shall close the case.”).
217 11 U.S.C. § 350(b); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 5010 (“A case may be reopened on motion of the debtor
or other party in interest pursuant to § 350(b) of the Code. In a chapter 7, 12, or 13 case a trustee shall not be
appointed by the United States trustee unless the court determines that a trustee is necessary to protect the
interests of creditors and the debtor or to insure efficient administration of the case.”).
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Because reopening a bankruptcy case is discretionary, some courts may consider
the debtor’s failure to schedule a potential lawsuit as bad faith and deny the
request.218 The bankruptcy court may also consider whether the creditors would
benefit by reopening the bankruptcy case and pursuing the lawsuit.219 In In re
Maloy, the bankruptcy court denied a debtor’s motion to reopen his bankruptcy
case because the debtor’s exemption claim likely exceeded the value of the
lawsuit, leaving no benefit for the creditors.220 Alternatively, some courts find
that reopening the bankruptcy case to administer an asset is required “where
‘assets of such probability, administrability, and substance’ appear to exist as to
make it unreasonable under all the circumstances for the court not to deal with
them.”221
Allowing the debtor to reopen her bankruptcy case does not prevent the court
hearing her lawsuit from applying judicial estoppel, regardless of the disposition
of the bankruptcy case.222 In Barger v. City of Cartersville, the district court
dismissed Barger’s lawsuit on grounds of judicial estoppel.223 One week prior to
the district court’s order, Barger had successfully reopened her bankruptcy
case.224 One week after the district court’s order, the bankruptcy court issued a
written order finding that Barger’s failure to disclose the lawsuit “was caused by
her bankruptcy attorney’s ‘inadvertence’ and had no substantive effect on the
bankruptcy petition.”225 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that Barger’s
failure to disclose the lawsuit “could not in any event be considered

218 See In re Lopez, 283 B.R. at 25. The bankruptcy court in In re Lopez denied the debtor’s motion to
reopen and on appeal, the Appellate Panel found that the court “appeared to be motivated in part by a desire to
sanction [the debtor] for not previously disclosing the Action.” Id. at 29. The Appellate Panel found that although
a motion to reopen is addressed to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court, “the court has the duty to reopen
an estate whenever prima facie proof is made that it has not been fully administered.” Id. at 27 (quoting Kozman
v. Herzig (In re Herzig), 96 B.R. 264, 266 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989)).
219 See In re Lopez, 283 B.R. at 29 (noting that situations may exist where creditors would not benefit from
the reopening of a bankruptcy case).
220 See In re Maloy, 195 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996) (denying the debtor’s motion to reopen the
bankruptcy case).
221 In re Lopez, 283 B.R. at 27 (quoting In re Herzig, 96 B.R. at 266); see also In re Maloy, 195 B.R. at 521
(concluding that the debtor should be allowed “to continue his claim in the District Court, subject to
encumbrances, if any, which might have attached as a result of his failure to timely list the asset during the
pendency of the bankruptcy case”).
222 See, e.g., Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (where reopening the
bankruptcy case did not preclude the district court from applying judicial estoppel to the debtor’s lawsuit).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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inadvertent”226 and affirmed the district court’s order estopping the debtorplaintiff’s claims for money damages.227 Not only does Barger illustrate the
inequity caused by judicial estoppel with regard to the debtor-plaintiff and the
debtor-plaintiff’s creditors, it also demonstrates judicial estoppel’s failure to
protect the bankruptcy court’s interests.
IV. AN EQUITABLE FRAMEWORK BASED ON THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
As early as 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that in dealing with
undisclosed assets from bankruptcy, the proper framework requires a
consideration of equitable concerns from the standpoint of the courts, the debtor,
and the creditors.228 The proper framework also requires a holistic incorporation
of the Bankruptcy Code’s fundamental provisions. This Part first discusses how
judicial estoppel has failed to address these concerns. This Part concludes with
a proposed framework that acts in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code and
equitable considerations.
A. Application of Judicial Estoppel Thwarts the Goals of Judicial Estoppel
and the Bankruptcy System
One of the goals of the bankruptcy system is ensuring a fair distribution of
the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors.229 When courts use judicial
estoppel to dismiss a debtor-plaintiff’s lawsuit, the debtor-plaintiff is not the
226 Id. at 1295. Ignoring the potential benefit to the bankruptcy estate and the creditors, the court in Barger
instead focused on punishing the debtor-plaintiff. The court reiterated its reasoning from a previous case, finding
that allowing the debtor-plaintiff to reopen her bankruptcy case “suggests that a debtor should consider
disclosing potential assets only if he is caught concealing them,” and “would only diminish the necessary
incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of the debtor’s assets.” Id. at 1297 (quoting
Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002)).
227 Id. at 1297. Although the court in Barger allowed the debtor-plaintiff to proceed on her injunctive relief
claims, id., estopping the claims for money damages that could potentially benefit the bankruptcy estate is what
ultimately harms creditors and the bankruptcy system.
228 See First Nat’l Bank of Jacksboro v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 119 (1905) (“It cannot be that a bankrupt,
by omitting to schedule and withholding from his trustee all knowledge of certain property, can, after his estate
in bankruptcy has been finally closed up, immediately thereafter assert title to the property on the ground that
the trustee had never taken any action in respect to it. If the claim was of value (as certainly this claim was,
according to the judgment below) it was something to which the creditors were entitled, and this bankrupt could
not, by withholding knowledge of its existence, obtain a release from his debts and still assert title to the
property.”).
229 See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical
Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 413–15 (2005) (discussing the
equality principle as a goal of bankruptcy that “accords procedural relief to creditors in the form of an orderly,
collective process that administers the assets of a debtor to its creditors as a response to the common pool
problem that arises when a debtor has insufficient assets to repay his or her debts”).
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only affected party; any creditor who is not paid in full in the debtor-plaintiff’s
bankruptcy case is harmed by the initial failure to schedule the lawsuit and
further harmed by the non-bankruptcy court’s decision to estop the debtor’s
lawsuit if that lawsuit could have been pursued to benefit the creditors.230 This
is true regardless of whether the debtor-plaintiff’s failure to schedule the lawsuit
was intentional or inadvertent.231 In Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., even though the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “the effect of judicial estoppel on creditors is a
consideration that could discourage courts from applying the doctrine,” the court
upheld the district court’s decision applying judicial estoppel to an undisclosed
lawsuit.232 The optimal course of action would allow a newly appointed trustee
to weigh the considerations and decide whether to pursue the claim for the
benefit of creditors or abandon the claim to the debtor.233
Due to the nature of the undisclosed lawsuit situation, the judicial estoppel
defense arises in both federal and state courts.234 This fact is not unique to this
context; however, the lack of uniformity is a more important problem because
all undisclosed lawsuits subject to judicial estoppel arise out of bankruptcy
cases.235 Congress granted the federal district courts original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases.236 Congress went even further to grant
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all the property of the debtor and
property of the estate.237 However, state and federal courts have both been
deciding judicial estoppel cases that involve an undisclosed lawsuit from a
230

See Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 28 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the
Action has any value then creditors stand to benefit . . . .”).
231 See In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) (“[W]hen reopening of the case is sought
for the purpose of administering a previously undisclosed asset, the question of debtor’s good faith is
irrelevant.”).
232 677 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 2012).
233 See In re Lopez, 283 B.R. at 28. In In re Lopez, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel found that “[i]f the
[bankruptcy] case is reopened a chapter 7 trustee can be appointed, investigate whether the Action has value,
and then prosecute it, settle it, abandon it, or arrange for [the debtor] to prosecute it in exchange for the estate
receiving a share of the proceeds.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he chapter 7 trustee can also notify creditors to file claims
if it appears the estate may have any assets, and can make distributions on those claims out of any eventual
recovery.” Id.
234 See supra Part II.B–C.
235 See MSR Expl., Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is true that in many
circumstances state courts can, and do, resolve questions of federal law ‘with no difficulty.’ Nevertheless, the
unique, historical, and even constitutional need for uniformity in the administration of the bankruptcy laws is
another indication that Congress wished to leave the regulation of parties before the bankruptcy court in the
hands of the federal courts alone.” (citation omitted)); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265
(1929) (“The power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States is unrestricted and paramount.”).
236 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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debtor’s bankruptcy case.238 This issue is problematic at the most fundamental
level because all federal courts recognize the same doctrine of judicial
estoppel,239 but not all states apply the same doctrine.240 As a result, similarly
situated debtors are treated differently based on their choice of forum.241 By
enacting comprehensive federal bankruptcy legislation, Congress intended to
prevent this lack of uniformity.242 The lack of uniformity in state courts is only
the beginning of the problem in the undisclosed lawsuit context.
The lack of uniformity issue is exacerbated by the discord within federal
circuits in applying judicial estoppel.243 Even if state courts wanted to follow the
federal judicial estoppel doctrine with respect to undisclosed lawsuits from
bankruptcy, there is no coherent federal judicial estoppel doctrine for them to
follow.244 In the undisclosed lawsuit context, the federal circuits apply the Maine
factors differently, use different standards of review, apply different alternatives
to judicial estoppel, and apply different law when sitting in diversity.245
The lack of cohesion throughout the courts might have developed because
judicial estoppel is not equipped to deal with the unique circumstance of the
undisclosed lawsuit context.246 Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine meant
to protect the integrity of the judicial system, but in this context, it causes harm
to debtors, creditors, and the bankruptcy court system. An undisclosed lawsuit
is part of the bankruptcy estate,247 and had the lawsuit been properly scheduled,
it might have been pursued for the benefit of the creditors.248 Estopping a debtor
without allowing a trustee the opportunity to review the asset undermines the
bankruptcy system’s goal of having a fair distribution of the debtor’s assets for
the benefit of the creditors.249 Barring a debtor’s claim on the basis of judicial
238

See supra Part II.B–C.
See supra Part II.B.
240 See supra Part II.B.
241 See supra Part II.B–C.
242 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929) (finding that in the context of federal bankruptcy
law, “[t]he national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily excludes state regulation”); see also In re Ross,
18 B.R. 364, 367 (N.D.N.Y.) (“[S]tates are prohibited from interfering with the uniform nature of bankruptcy
law.”), aff’d sub nom. Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982).
243 See supra Part II.B.
244 See supra Part II.B.
245 See supra Part II.B.
246 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 98, §4477 (“Specific areas of federal law may carry with them special
needs of substance or judicial administration that support development of special rules of judicial estoppel that
reflect those needs. Bankruptcy proceedings furnish a good illustration.”).
247 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
248 See supra note 50.
249 See supra note 50.
239
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estoppel also provides a windfall to the defendant.250 The non-bankruptcy courts
ignore a defendant’s supposed wrongdoing based on the debtor’s mistake in her
bankruptcy case and not on the actual merits of the lawsuit.251 When the debtor’s
mistake is inadvertent, denying the debtor her day in court is hardly justifiable.
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, but its application in this context
creates inequitable results.252
In addition to the equitable concerns of applying judicial estoppel are the
statutory concerns. Many courts fail to incorporate fundamental provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code when applying judicial estoppel to an undisclosed asset.253
A cohesive interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code reveals a framework for the
undisclosed lawsuit context that is free of the statutory concerns created by
judicial estoppel as well as the equitable concerns.
B. An Equitable, Statutory Framework
The broad scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions defining property of
the estate and the automatic stay and the bankruptcy court’s broad jurisdictional
grant work in tandem to ensure the debtor’s affairs are centralized in a single
forum—the bankruptcy court.254 This centralization prevents conflicting
judgments from non-bankruptcy courts and harmonizes the interests of
creditors.255 Non-bankruptcy courts have recognized that undisclosed lawsuits
are property of the estate, but the same courts have failed to recognize the
applicability of the automatic stay and the bankruptcy court’s exclusive
jurisdiction. The automatic stay and the bankruptcy court’s broad jurisdictional
grant are essential to the proper functioning of the bankruptcy system and cannot

250 See Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 27 n.9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the defendant’s “possible judicial estoppel defense is a windfall that would bar what might be a successful
claim for sexual harassment”).
251 See id.
252 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Griner (In re Griner), 240 B.R. 432, 439 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1999) (finding
that the application of judicial estoppel to the debtor-plaintiff’s undisclosed lawsuit was “overly harsh and
inequitable as well,” and that “[e]veryone . . . loses under its theory”).
253 See In re Lopez, 283 B.R. at 31 (Klein, J., concurring) (writing “separately to emphasize salient practice
points about the problem of unscheduled causes of action that is increasingly a headache for nonbankruptcy
courts and litigants”). In In re Lopez, Judge Klein argued that “the judicial estoppel defense to the basic
unscheduled cause of action is meretricious and potentially inexpedient in two respects.” Id. First, “the trustee
is the real party in interest and the more correct defenses are that the action is not being prosecuted by the real
party in interest and that the debtor lacks standing.” Id. at 32. Second, “dismissing the action probably violates
the automatic stay.” Id.
254 Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1994).
255 Id.
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be ignored in this context.256 This section first details the correct application of
the automatic stay to undisclosed lawsuits from bankruptcy that necessitates
returning to the bankruptcy court. It then discusses the resulting jurisdictional
issues that arise when a bankruptcy case is pending. This section concludes by
providing an example of equitable treatment of an undisclosed lawsuit that
properly considers the goals of the bankruptcy system.
1. The Automatic Stay Continues to Act Against Undisclosed Lawsuits
The scope of the automatic stay is intentionally broad.257 The automatic stay
protects the interests of both debtors and creditors.258 It goes into effect
immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition259 and is essential to the
goals of the bankruptcy system.260 Despite all of this, nearly all courts applying
judicial estoppel have failed to consider the impact of the automatic stay on an
undisclosed lawsuit. Although courts applying judicial estoppel in this context
rely on the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of property of the estate, the
same courts completely ignore the role of the automatic stay. This piecemeal
approach to incorporating the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions into the judicial
estoppel analysis has led courts down a path of inconsistency and inequity.
The Bankruptcy Code dictates how undisclosed lawsuits should be handled
prior to any consideration of dismissal based on judicial estoppel. Filing a
bankruptcy petition automatically creates an estate that is comprised of nearly
all of the debtor’s property261 and also triggers the automatic stay, which
prevents nearly all acts against the debtor, property of the debtor, and property
of the estate.262 If a debtor has a lawsuit that should be part of the bankruptcy
estate when she files for bankruptcy, that lawsuit becomes property of the estate
upon filing, regardless of whether the debtor correctly schedules the cause of
action.263 When the debtor’s bankruptcy case is closed, property of the estate
256 See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Clark v. United States (In re Clark), 207 B.R. 559,
565 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) (“Congress placed the court at the vortex of bankruptcy proceedings and the
provisions of the automatic stay are designed as the initial channels that regulate the flow of economic
consequences, which, if left unchecked or diverted by extra judicial determinations, would drown a debtor’s
opportunity for a fresh start and destroy a creditor’s opportunity to receive payments . . . .”).
257 In re Elrod, 523 B.R. 790, 796 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2015).
258 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
259 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
260 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
261 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
262 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Tyler v. DH Capital Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 455, 465
(6th Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court had given “undue significance” to the bankruptcy scheduling
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that has been scheduled and not administered is abandoned back to the debtor
and deemed administered.264 Property that is not administered or abandoned
under § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code “remains property of the estate.”265
Property that is not scheduled remains property of the estate indefinitely after
the bankruptcy case is closed.266 Under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
automatic stay continues to act against property of the estate “until such property
is no longer property of the estate.”267 Thus, the automatic stay continues to act
against undisclosed lawsuits indefinitely.268
Section 362 acts as a stay against “any act to obtain possession of property
of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property
of the estate.”269 Dismissing a debtor-plaintiff’s claim that is property of the
estate constitutes “exercis[ing] control over property of the estate” in violation
of the automatic stay.270 The bankruptcy court is the only court that can
“terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay.”271 Accordingly, parties must
return to the bankruptcy court to get relief from the automatic stay before taking
any act that may qualify as exercising control over an undisclosed lawsuit.

process and further noting that “[s]ection 541 is the beginning and end of the analysis of whether a cause of
action is property of the estate”).
264 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
265 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
266 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
267 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) (2012).
268 See Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Co. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 32 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (Klein, J.,
concurring) (noting that because “the automatic stay remains in effect to protect property of the estate so long
as it is property of the estate, even after the bankruptcy case is closed[,] dismissing the action probably violates
the automatic stay” (citation omitted)); see also Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 820 F.3d 1193, 1245 (11th Cir.)
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (11th Cir. 2016).
269 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
270 See Acands, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that the
automatic stay applied to an arbitration “once it became apparent that proceeding further could negatively impact
the bankruptcy estate” and noting that “Section 362(a)(3) . . . applies to actions against third parties as well as
actions against the debtor”); see also Klein, Ponoroff & Borrey, supra note 112, at 884 (“The continued
applicability of the automatic stay casts doubt on the ability of the nonbankruptcy court to dismiss the action.”);
supra note 268 and accompanying text; cf. Slater, 820 F.3d at 1225 n.84 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring)
(proposing that when a party opposes a debtor-plaintiff’s motion to reopen her bankruptcy case, the party is
“engaging in an ‘act to obtain possession of property of the estate’” in violation of the automatic stay); Montoya
v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., No. 15-CV-01580 (ALC) (KNF), 2017 WL 1167336, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2017) (noting that the debtor-plaintiff's decision to bring an undisclosed lawsuit “without declaring his
interest in it to the bankruptcy court likely violated § 362(a)(3)’s proscription against ‘any act to obtain . . . or to
exercise control over property of the estate’”).
271 In re Dominguez, 312 B.R. 499, 505 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[I]t is undisputed that only a bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay.” (emphasis omitted)); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(G) (2012).
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Failure to return to the bankruptcy court in this context has a significant
implication: judgments that are ordered in violation of the automatic stay are
void in the majority of jurisdictions.272 Void judgments do not have claim
preclusive effect.273 If the statute of limitations on a debtor-plaintiff’s claim has
not run, she should be able to pursue her claim under this argument.
For a non-bankruptcy court to proceed with a lawsuit where the defendant
has raised the defense of judicial estoppel or the debtor’s lack of standing, this
Comment argues that the lawsuit must be stayed so the parties can petition the
bankruptcy court to reopen the bankruptcy case to request relief from the
automatic stay and permit the bankruptcy court to properly administer the
asset.274 The continued application of the automatic stay necessitates this
action.275 Moreover, this action ensures the involvement of the bankruptcy court
and eliminates the issue of notice discussed in Part III. If the bankruptcy court
reopens the case, the bankruptcy court may then appoint a bankruptcy trustee
who “has authority to act for the benefit of the estate and may sell the cause of
action, prosecute it in nonbankruptcy court, settle it, or abandon it to the debtor
as of inconsequential value to the estate.”276 The trustee’s decision in
administering the claim will depend on the specific facts of the bankruptcy case
and the lawsuit.
2. The Bankruptcy Court’s Exclusive Jurisdiction over Undisclosed Lawsuits
The continued effect of the automatic stay in the undisclosed lawsuit context
necessitates reopening the bankruptcy case, which in turn creates a jurisdictional
issue in both federal and state courts. When a bankruptcy case is open, the
federal district court, and by referral the bankruptcy court, has exclusive
272 See LaBarge v. Vierkant (In re Vierkant), 240 B.R. 317, 322 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999) (“The overwhelming
majority of the circuits hold that an action in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio.” (emphasis added)).
273 See In re Vierkant, 240 B.R. at 325 (“[A]n action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab
initio, . . . [and] as a matter of law, a void default judgment cannot be given collateral estoppel effect . . . .”).
274 See Lopez v. Specialty Rests. Corp. (In re Lopez), 283 B.R. 22, 32 (Klein, J., concurring) (“The
expedient solution to [the undisclosed lawsuit] dilemma is to require the parties to return to bankruptcy court for
reopening so that a trustee can be appointed to deal with the cause of action that is property of the estate.”).
Staying the lawsuit and moving the bankruptcy court to reopen the case and appoint a trustee would also help
satisfy Federal Rule 17(a)(3)’s mandate that the court may not dismiss the lawsuit until the real party in interest
is given a reasonable time to intervene. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
275 See Klein, Ponoroff & Borrey, supra note 112, at 884.
276 In re Lopez, 283 B.R. at 32–33 (Klein, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also Montoya v. Daniel
O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., No. 15-CV-01580 (ALC) (KNF), 2017 WL 1167336, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017)
(finding that the trustee pursuing the undisclosed lawsuit as the real party in interest “is not precluded by [the
automatic stay], as this section ‘does not address actions . . . which would inure to the benefit of the bankruptcy
estate’” (quoting In re Abreu, 527 B.R. 570, 579 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015))).
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jurisdiction over property of the estate.277 Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), “[e]ach
district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11
shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.”278 Under § 157(c),
“bankruptcy judge[s] may hear a proceeding . . . that is otherwise related to a
case under title 11.”279
An undisclosed lawsuit that is property of the estate is arguably related to the
bankruptcy case and must be referred to the bankruptcy court.280 All federal
districts have a local rule or standing order referring cases under Title 11 to the
bankruptcy court.281 The Eastern District of Missouri’s local rule refers all cases
under Title 11 as well as all proceedings related to a case under Title 11.282 The
language of the local rule creates a mandatory referral and not a discretionary
one.283 In the Eastern District of Missouri and any other district with a mandatory
referral rule, any lawsuit that is brought in a federal district court that is related
to a bankruptcy case must be referred to the bankruptcy court.284 In a district
277

See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2012) (granting “exclusive jurisdiction” over property of the estate to the
“district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending”); In re Baker, No. 11-12703, 2015
WL 628257, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Jan. 14, 2015) (“The determination of ‘what constitutes property of the
estate and what actions are permitted or prohibited by the stay’ falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court.” (quoting Clark v. United States (In re Clark), 207 B.R. 559, 564–65 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1997))).
278 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012).
279 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
280 See Richardson v. United Parcel Serv., 195 B.R. 737, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding that the debtorplaintiff’s claim was related to the bankruptcy case because “it could conceivably have an effect on the estate”).
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan found that administering a referred undisclosed
lawsuit was a core proceeding. Johnson v. Lewis Cass Intermediate Sch. Dist. (In re Johnson), 345 B.R. 816,
818 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006) (“This adversary proceeding is a core proceeding because it involves the
administration of the debtor’s estate and affects the liquidation of the assets of the estate and the debtor-creditor
relationships.” (citations omitted)).
281 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
282 E.D. MO. R. BANKR. P. 81-9.01(B)(1) (“All cases under Title 11 of the United States Code, and all
proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to a case under Title 11, are referred to the bankruptcy
judges for this district, who shall exercise the full extent of the authority conferred upon them.” (emphasis
added)).
283 See Richardson, 195 B.R. at 740 (applying the Eastern District of Missouri’s local rule and finding that
“the Court must refer this case to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings” because the “[p]laintiff’s
employment discrimination case [was] related to the bankruptcy as it could conceivably have an effect on the
estate being administered in the bankruptcy” (emphasis added)).
284 See id.; see also Bruce H. White, Maneuvering a “Related to” Case from State Court to Bankruptcy
Court in Another Jurisdiction, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 1997, at 30, 30 (“The district courts in many
jurisdictions have adopted local rules whereby matters such as those in § 157(a) are automatically referred to the
bankruptcy court for the district.”). If an undisclosed lawsuit is in a different federal district than the district in
which the debtor-plaintiff filed for bankruptcy, the lawsuit would first have to be transferred to the appropriate
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1412, which provides that “[a] district court may transfer a case or proceeding
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where referral to the bankruptcy court is not mandatory, the district court may
voluntarily refer the lawsuit to the bankruptcy court.285
State courts lack jurisdiction over property of the estate once a bankruptcy
case is reopened.286 However, moving a lawsuit from state court to the
bankruptcy court is a more complicated matter.287 Generally, the lawsuit may
not be removed from state court directly to the bankruptcy court.288 Instead, the
lawsuit must first be removed to the district court and then may be transferred to
the bankruptcy court by referral.289 In some federal districts, referral to the
bankruptcy court may occur automatically once a notice of removal is filed.290
Although this process may be cumbersome, “it is the method by which
jurisdictional pitfalls can be avoided.”291
3. Equitable Treatment of Undisclosed Lawsuits
The following case provides an example of what may happen if a debtorplaintiff’s undisclosed lawsuit is referred to the bankruptcy court. In Richardson
v. United Parcel Service, the debtor-plaintiff brought an employment
discrimination claim in the district court for the Eastern District of Missouri.292
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the debtor-plaintiff

under title 11 to a district court for another district, in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties.”
28 U.S.C. § 1412 (2012); see also White, supra, at 30.
285 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 345 B.R. at 821 (entering an order referring the proceeding to the bankruptcy
court to decide the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a theory of judicial estoppel).
286 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2012) (granting “exclusive jurisdiction” over property of the estate to the
“district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending”).
287 See generally White, supra note 284 (discussing the issues involved to move a claim from a state court
to a bankruptcy court).
288 See Berger v. Schuler (In re Schuler), 45 B.R. 684, 686 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (“28 U.S.C. § 1452 . . .
clearly provides that removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases shall be to the district court. No mention is
made of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court achieves jurisdiction only by referral of cases and
proceedings to it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157.”).
289 Id. This process is further complicated if the state court is not in the same state as the bankruptcy court.
In this situation, the claim could not be removed directly to the district where the bankruptcy case is pending.
See White, supra note 284 (“[Section 1452] does not permit removal of an action directly to a district court or
bankruptcy court in another state or jurisdiction.”). The claim would have to be removed “to the district court
for the district where such civil action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2012). Then the claim could be
transferred to the appropriate federal district court and, by referral, the bankruptcy court. See White, supra note
284.
290 See, e.g., Jeffries v. Bar J. Forest Prods., Inc. (In re Jeffries), 191 B.R. 861, 863 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995)
(“In Oregon, the notice of removal is automatically referred to the bankruptcy court by the federal district court
pursuant to standing orders issued under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).”).
291 White, supra note 284, at 31.
292 195 B.R. 737, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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lacked standing to pursue the claim because he had failed to schedule the claim
in his bankruptcy petition.293 The defendant also argued for dismissal based on
judicial estoppel.294 The district court in Richardson found that it must refer the
debtor-plaintiff’s case to the bankruptcy court because the case was related to
the debtor-plaintiff’s bankruptcy “as it could conceivably have an effect on the
estate being administered in the bankruptcy.”295 The court denied the
defendant’s motions to dismiss without prejudice and referred the case to the
bankruptcy court for further proceedings.296 Following the referral to the
bankruptcy court, the defendant filed another motion to dismiss on the ground
of judicial estoppel,297 and the trustee intervened in the proceeding.298 The
bankruptcy court denied the defendant’s motion,299 and the trustee settled the
proceeding for $1500 for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.300
Once a bankruptcy case is reopened and the undisclosed lawsuit is referred
to the bankruptcy court, there are many possible outcomes that will not violate
the automatic stay or other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The outcome in
Richardson is what may happen if a trustee finds that pursuing the undisclosed
lawsuit would be beneficial to the bankruptcy estate. Referring the lawsuit to the
bankruptcy court does not eliminate the judicial estoppel defense. If the
bankruptcy court applies judicial estoppel, it will be bound by the same
precedents as federal district courts.301 However, the bankruptcy court is better
situated to determine whether the debtor-plaintiff’s lawsuit should be estopped
based on the Maine factors and other important considerations that should be
weighed in the bankruptcy context.302 For example, the bankruptcy court may
use its discretion to invoke other statutorily created options for penalizing a

293

Id.
Id.
295 Id. at 740.
296 Id.
297 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Richardson v. United Parcel Serv., No. 96-ap-04255 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
July 10, 1996), ECF No. 4.
298 Motion to Intervene, Richardson v. United Parcel Serv., No. 96-ap-04255 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. July 26,
1996), ECF No. 9.
299 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Richardson v. United Parcel Serv., No. 96-ap-04255
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 1996), ECF No. 12.
300 Stipulation and Order Dismissing Complaint as Settled, Richardson v. United Parcel Serv., No. 96-ap04255 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 1996), ECF No. 13.
301 See, e.g., Johnson v. Lewis Cass Intermediate Sch. Dist. (In re Johnson), 345 B.R. 816, 822–24 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 2006) (applying judicial estoppel under the Sixth Circuit’s precedents).
302 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 98, § 4477 (“Specific areas of federal law may carry with them special
needs of substance or judicial administration that support development of special rules of judicial estoppel that
reflect those needs. Bankruptcy proceedings furnish a good illustration.”).
294
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debtor who acted in bad faith to avoid further harm to creditors.303 By invoking
statutorily prescribed penalties for debtor misconduct when necessary—instead
of judicial estoppel—bankruptcy courts can issue orders that protect the judicial
system without creating inequitable results for creditors.
The Supreme Court developed flexible factors for judicial estoppel because
the doctrine should be applied on a case-by-case basis.304 The application of
judicial estoppel should not undermine the goals of bankruptcy or violate the
Bankruptcy Code. When a debtor fails to disclose a lawsuit in bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy court is in the best position to weigh the necessary considerations
and issue orders that are equitable and uphold the goals of the bankruptcy
system.305
CONCLUSION
This Comment analyzes the application of judicial estoppel to undisclosed
lawsuits from bankruptcy. Although non-bankruptcy courts have been issuing
orders based on judicial estoppel in this context for years, this Comment argues
that non-bankruptcy courts violate the automatic stay by issuing such orders.
The continued effect of the automatic stay on property of the estate necessitates
the reopening of the debtor’s bankruptcy case so that the undisclosed lawsuit
may be properly administered.
Further, this Comment demonstrates that the bankruptcy court is in the best
position to determine whether to judicially estop a debtor-plaintiff’s lawsuit.
Although the variance throughout the circuits regarding judicial estoppel does
not disappear simply because the bankruptcy court is applying judicial estoppel,
the bankruptcy court is in a position to make a more equitable ruling because of
its familiarity with the debtor, the debtor’s bankruptcy case, and the creditors.
Most importantly, returning to the bankruptcy court will accomplish judicial
estoppel’s goal of protecting the integrity of the courts by allowing bankruptcy

303

See, e.g., supra notes 208–10.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
305 Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[D]etermining whether a litigant is
playing fast and loose with the courts has a subjective element [and] [i]ts resolution draws upon the trier’s
intimate knowledge of the case at bar and his or her first-hand observations of the lawyers and their litigation
strategies.” (quoting Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2004))).
304
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courts to properly uphold the goals of the bankruptcy system while not violating
the Bankruptcy Code or the jurisdictional grant of bankruptcy courts.
CARYN WANG
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